We examine the accuracy and contribution of the default forecasting model based on Merton's (1974) bond pricing model and developed by the KMV corporation. Comparing the KMVMerton model to a similar but much simpler alternative, we find that it performs slightly worse as a predictor in hazard models and in out of sample forecasts. Moreover, several other forecasting variables are also important predictors, and fitted hazard model values outperform KMV-Merton default probabilities out of sample. Implied default probabilities from credit default swaps and corporate bond yield spreads are only weakly correlated with KMV-Merton default probabilities after adjusting for agency ratings, bond characteristics, and our alternative predictor. We conclude that the KMV-Merton model does not produce a sufficient statistic for the probability of default, and it appears to be possible to construct such a sufficient statistic without solving the simultaneous nonlinear equations required by the KMV-Merton model.
Due to the advent of innovative corporate debt products and credit derivatives, academics and practitioners have recently shown renewed interest in models that forecast corporate defaults.
One innovative forecasting model which has been widely applied in both practice and academic research 1 is a particular application of Merton's model (Merton, 1974) that was developed by the KMV corporation, which we refer to as the KMV-Merton model 2 . This paper assesses the accuracy and the contribution of the KMV-Merton model.
The KMV-Merton model applies the framework of Merton (1974) , in which the equity of the firm is a call option on the underlying value of the firm with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm's debt. The model recognizes that neither the underlying value of the firm nor its volatility are directly observable. Under the model's assumptions both can be inferred from the value of equity, the volatility of equity and several other observable variables by solving two nonlinear simultaneous equations. After inferring these values, the model specifies that the probability of default is the normal cumulative density function of a z-score depending on the firm's underlying value, the firm's volatility and the face value of the firm's debt.
The KMV-Merton model is a clever application of classic finance theory, but how well it performs in forecasting depends on how realistic its assumptions are. The model is a somewhat stylized structural model that requires a number of assumptions. Among other things, the model assumes that the underlying value of each firm follows geometric Browninan motion and that each firm has issued just one zero-coupon bond. If the model's strong assumptions are violated, it should be possible to construct a reduced form model with more accuracy.
We examine two hypotheses in this paper. First, we ask whether the probability of default implied by the Merton model is a sufficient statistic for forecasting bankruptcy. If the Merton model is literally true, it should be impossible to improve on the model's implied probability for forecasting. If it is possible to construct a reduced form model with better predictive properties, we can conclude that the KMV-Merton probability (π KMV ) is not a sufficient statistic for forecasting default.
Our second hypothesis is that the Merton model is an important quantity to consider when predicting default. We hypothesize that the information in π KMV cannot be completely replaced by a reasonable set of simple variables, or that a sufficient statistic for default probabiltity cannot neglect π KMV . We actually separate the KMV-Merton technique into two potentially important components: the functional form for default probability implied by the Merton model and the solution of two simultaneous nonlinear equations required by the model. It is possible that one of these components is important while the other is not.
We test these two hypotheses in five ways. First, we incorporate π KMV into a hazard model that forecasts defaults from 1980 through 2003. With the hazard model, we compare π KMV to a naive alternative (π Naive ) which is much simpler to calculate, but retains some of the functional form of π KMV . We also compare it to several other default forecasting variables. Second, we compare the short term, out of sample forecasting ability of π KMV to that of π Naive . Third, we examine the forecasting ability of several alternative predictors, each of which calculates KMVMerton probabilities in a slightly different way. Fourth, we examine the ability of KMV-Merton probabilities to explain the probability of default implied by credit default swaps, and fifth we regress corporate bond yield spreads on π KMV , π Naive and other variables.
Assessing the KMV-Merton model's value is of importance for two reasons. Perhaps the most important reason is that many researchers and practitioners are applying the model without knowing very much about its statistical properties. For example, Vassalou and Xing (2003) use π KMV to examine whether default risk is priced in equity returns. As a second example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) considers exploiting the KMV-Merton model a viable practice currently employed by numerous banks. To have confidence in both the risk management of the banking sector and the accuracy of academic research, the power of the KMV-Merton model must be examined.
A second reason to assess the KMV-Merton model is to test the Merton (1974) 
model in a new
way. If the Merton model is literally true, π KMV should be the best default predictor available.
The Merton model has been rejected previously for failing to fit observed bond yield spreads. 3
Comparing the model to reduced form alternatives gives us a fresh perspective about how realistic the model's assumptions are.
Over the past several years, a number of reserchers have examined the contribution of the KMV-3 see Jones et al. (1984) .
Merton Model. The first authors to examine the model carefully were practitioners employed by either KMV or Moody's. A couple of years ago, several papers addressing the accuracy of the KMV-Merton model were available on the internet. Some papers, including Stein (2000) , Sobehart and Stein (2000) and Sobehart and Keenan (1999) argued that KMV-Merton models can easily be improved upon. Other papers, including Kealhofer and Kurbat (2001) , argued that KMV-Merton models capture all of the information in traditional agency ratings and well known accounting variables. Curiously, while some practitioner papers can now be found in print, including Sobehart and Keenan (2002a) and (2002b) and Falkenstein and Boral (2001) , it has become very difficult to find electronic copies of some of the papers cited above since Moody's acquired KMV in April 2002.
Perhaps in response, an academic literature has recently developed that critically assesses the model. Both Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004) and Du and Suo (2004) examine the model's predictive power in ways that are similar to some of our analyses. Duffie and Wang (2004) show that KMV-Merton probabilities have significant predictive power in a model of default probabilties over time, which can generate a term structure of default probabilities. Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2004) estimate hazard models that incorporate both π KMV and other variables for bankruptcy, finding that π KMV seems to have relatively little forecasting power after conditioning on other variables. While our findings are consistent with the findings of all of these papers, we analyze the performance of π KMV in several novel ways. In particular, we introduce and assess our naive predictor and we examine the ability of π KMV to explain credit default swap premia and bond yield spreads. Like all of these researchers, we have no particular interest in finding evidence for or against the KMV-Merton model. Therefore, we hope to help resolve confusion about some of the issues raised in the practitioner literature described above.
We find that it is fairly easy to reject hypothesis one, or that π KMV is not a sufficient statistic for default probability. We also find that after conditioning on π Naive , it appears to be possible to construct a reduced form model that does not benefit by conditioning on π KMV (or in which π KMV is not statistically significant). We therefore conclude that while π KMV has some predictive power for default, most of the marginal benefit of π KMV comes from its functional form rather than from the solution of the two nonlinear equations on which it is based. The contribution of π KMV to a well-specified reduced form model is fairly low.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section details the KMV-Merton model, our naive alternative default probability, and the hazard models that we use to build reduced form models.
Section I also lists several ways in which our KMV-Merton model differs from the model that Moodys KMV actually sells. Section II discusses the data that we use for our tests and Section III outlines our results. We conclude in Section IV.
I. Default Forecasting Models
As discussed above, we examine our hypotheses by examining the statistical and economic significance of the KMV-Merton default probabilities (π KMV ) and a simple, naive alternative (π Naive ). 
A. The KMV-Merton Model
The KMV-Merton default forecasting model produces a probability of default for each firm in the sample at any given point in time. To calculate the probability, the model subtracts the face value of the firm's debt from from an estimate of the market value of the firm and then divides this difference by an estimate of the volatility of the firm (scaled to reflect the horizon of the forecast).
The resulting z-score, which is referred to as the distance to default, is then substituted into a cumulative density function to calculate the probability that the value of the firm will be less than the face value of debt at the forecasting horizon. The market value of the firm is simply the sum of the market values of the firm's debt and the value of its equity. If both these quantities were readily observable, calculating default probabilities would be simple. While equity values are readily available, reliable data on the market value of firm debt is generally unavailable.
The KMV-Merton model estimates the market value of debt by applying the Merton (1974) bond pricing model. The Merton model makes two particularly important assumptions. The first is that the total value of a firm is assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion,
where V is the total value of the firm, µ is the expected continuously compounded return on V , σ V is the volatility of firm value and dW is a standard Weiner process. The second critical assumption of the Merton model is that the firm has issued just one discount bond maturing in T periods.
Under these assumptions, the equity of the firm is a call option on the underlying value of the firm with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm's debt and a time-to-maturity of T .
Moreover, the value of equity as a function of the total value of the firm can be described by the Black-Scholes-Merton Formula. By put-call parity, the value of the firm's debt is equal to the value of a risk-free discount bond minus the value of a put option written on the firm, again with a strike price equal to the face value of debt and a time-to-maturity of T .
Symbolically, the Merton model stipulates that the equity value of a firm satisfies
where E is the market value of the firm's equity, F is the face value of the firm's debt, r is the instantaneous risk-free rate, N (·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, d 1 is given by
and
While this is a fairly complicated equation, most financial economists are familiar with this formula as the Black-Scholes-Merton option valuation equation.
The KMV-Merton model makes use of two important equations. The first is the Black-ScholesMerton equation (2), expressing the value of a firm's equity as a function of the value of the firm.
The second relates the volatility of the firm's value to the volatility of its equity. Under Merton's assumptions the value of equity is a function of the value of the firm and time, so it follows directly from Ito's lemma that
In the Black-Scholes-Merton model, it can be shown that
, so that under the Merton model's assumptions, the volatilities of the firm and its equity are related by
where d 1 is defined in equation (3).
The KMV-Merton model basically uses these two nonlinear equations, (2) and (5), to translate the value and volatility of a firm's equity into an implied probability of default. In most applications, the Black-Scholes-Merton model describes the unobserved value of an option as a function of four variables that are easily observed (strike price, time-to-maturity, underlying asset price, and the risk-free rate) and one variable that can be estimated (volatility). 4 In the KMV-Merton model, however, the value of the option is observed as the total value of the firm's equity, while the value of the underlying asset (the value of the firm) is not directly observable. Thus, while V must be inferred, E is easy to observe in the marketplace by multiplying the firm's shares outstanding by its current stock price. Similarly, in the KMV-Merton model, the volatility of equity, σ E , can be estimated but the volatility of the underlying firm, σ V must be inferred.
The first step in implementing the KMV-Merton model is to estimate σ E from either historical stock returns data or from option implied volatility data. The second step is to choose a forecasting horizon and a measure of the face value of the firm's debt. For example, it is common to use historical returns data to estimate σ E , assume a forecasting horizon of one year (T = 1), and take the book value of the firm's total liabilities to be the face value of the firm's debt. The third step is to collect values of the risk-free rate and the market equity of the firm. After performing these three steps, we have values for each of the variables in equations (2) and (5) except for V and σ V , the total value of the firm and the volatility of firm value respectively.
The fourth, and perhaps most significant step in implementing the model is to simultaneously solve equations (2) and (5) numerically for values of V and σ V . Once this numerical solution is obtained, the distance to default can be calculated as
where µ is an estimate of the expected annual return of the firm's assets. The corresponding implied probability of default, sometimes called the expected default frequency (or EDF), is
If the assumptions of the Merton model really hold, the KMV-Merton model should give very accurate default forecasts. In fact, if the Merton model holds completely, the implied probability 4 Of course, it is common to infer an implied volatility from an observed option price.
of default defined above, π KMV , should be a sufficient statistic for default forecasts. Testing this hypothesis is one of the central task of this paper.
Simultaneously solving equations (2) and (5) (2) to infer the market value of each firm's assets every day for the previous year. We then calculate the implied log return on assets each day and use that returns series to generate new estimates of σ V and µ. We iterate on σ V in this manner until it converges (so the absolute difference in adjacent σ V s is less than 10 −3 ). Unless specified otherwise, in the rest of the paper values of π KMV are calculated by following this iterative procedure and calculating the corresponding implied default probability using equation (7).
Before describing alternative models, it is useful to interpret the KMV-Merton model a little.
The most critical inputs to the model are clearly the market value of equity, the face value of debt, and the volatility of equity. As the market value of equity declines, the probablity of default increases. This is both a strength and weakness of the model. For the model to work well, both the Merton model assumptions must be met and markets must be efficient and well informed.
In its promotional material, KMV points to the Enron case as an example of how their method is superior to that of traditional agency ratings. When Enron's stock price began to fall, its distance to default immediately decreased. The ratings agencies took several days to downgrade Enron's debt. Clearly, using equity values to infer default probabilities allows the KMV-Merton model to reflect information faster than traditional agency ratings. However, when Enron's stock price was unsustainably high, KMV's expected default frequency for Enron was actually significantly lower than the default probability assigned to Enron by standard ratings. If markets are not perfectly efficient, then conditioning on information not captured by π KMV probably makes sense. 
B. Our Method versus Moody's KMV

C. A Naive Alternative
To test whether π KMV adds value to reduced form models, we construct a simple alternative "probability" that does not require simultaneously solving equations (2) and (5) or implementing the iterative procedure described above. We construct our naive predictor with two objectives. First, we want our naive predictor to have a reasonable chance of performing as well as the KMV-Merton predictor, so we want it to capture the same information that the KMV-Merton predictor uses. We also want our naive probability to approximate the functional form of the KMV-Merton probability. Second, we want our naive probability to be simple, so we avoid simultaneously solving any equations or estimating any difficult quantities in its construction. We wrote down the form for our naive probability after studying the KMV-Merton model for a little while. None of the numerical choices below is the result of any type of estimation or optimization.
To begin constructing our naive probability, we approximate the market value of each firm's debt with the face value of its debt,
Since firms that are close to default have very risky debt, and the risk of their debt is correlated with their equity risk, we approximate the volatility of each firm's debt as
We include the five percentage points in this term to represent term structure volatility, and we include the twenty-five percent times equity volatility to allow for volatility associated with default risk. This gives us an approximation to the total volatility of the firm of
. (10) Next, We set the expected return on the firm's assets equal to the firm's stock return over the previous year,
This allows us to capture some of the same information that is captured by the KMV-Merton iterative procedure described above. The iterative procedure is able to condition on an entire year of equity return data. By allowing our naive estimate of µ to depend on past returns, we incorporate the same information. The naive distance to default is then
This naive alternative model is easy to compute -it does not require solving the equations simultaneously. However, it retains the structure of the KMV-Merton distance to default and expected default frequency. It also captures approximately the same quantity of information as the KMVMerton probability. Thus, examining the forecasting ability of this quantity will help us separate the value of simultaneously solving the equations and the value of the functional form of π KMV .
We define our naive probability estimate as
It is fairly easy to criticize our naive probability. Our choices for modeling firm volatility are not particularly well motivated and our decision to use past returns for µ is arbitrary at best. However, to quibble with our naive probability is to miss the point of our exercise. We have constructed a predictor that is extremely easy to calculate, and it may have significant predictive power. If the predictive power of our naive probability is comparable to that of π KMV , then presumably a more carefully constructed probability that captures the same information should have superior power.
D. Alternative Predictors
One purpose of our paper is to examine the relative importance of several of the components of the KMV-Merton calculation. Comparing the predictive perfomance of our naive probability to that of π KMV is one way to accomplish this purpose. Another way we accomplish this purpose is by examining the predictive performance of several alternative predictors, or predictors that calculate KMV-Merton default probabilities in alternative, somewhat simpler ways.
One predictor, π µ=r KMV , is calculated in exactly the same manner as π KMV , except that the expected return on assets used for π KMV is replaced by the risk-free rate, r. Considering this predictor helps us gauge the importance of estimating the expected return on assets for the distance to default.
A second alternative predictor, π simul KMV , is calculated by simultaneously solving equations (2) and (5). This predictor avoids the iterative procedure in the text, estimating equity volatility with one year of historical returns data and using r as the expected return on assets. The third alternative predictor, π impσ KMV , uses the option-implied volatility of firm equity (implied σ E ) to simultaneously solve equations (2) and (5).
E. Hazard Models
In order to assess the KMV-Merton model's accuracy, we need a method to compare π KMV to alternative predictor variables. We employ a Cox proportional hazard model to test our two hypotheses. Hazard models have recently been applied by a number of authors and probably represent the state of the art in default forecasting with reduced form models 6 . Proportional hazard models make the assumption that the hazard rate, λ(t), or the probability of default at time t conditional on survival (lack of default) until time t is,
where φ(t) is referred to as the "baseline" hazard rate and the term exp(x(t) β) allows the expected time to default to vary across firms according to their covariates, x(t). The baseline hazard rate is common to all firms. Note that in this model the covariates may vary with time. Most of our default predictors, including the KMV-Merton probability, vary with time. The Cox proportional hazard model does not impose any structure on the baseline hazard φ(t). Cox's partial likelihood estimator provides a way of estimating β without requiring estimates of φ(t). It can also handle censoring of observations, which is one of the features of the data. Details about estimating the proportional hazard model can be found in many places, including in Cox and Oakes (1984) .
Our first hypothesis, that the KMV-Merton probability is a sufficient statistic for forecasting default, implies that no other variable in a hazard model should be a stastically significant covariate.
Our second hypothesis, that the KMV-Merton probability is a useful quantity, implies that no other set of variables should be able to make the probability insignificant. As a robustness check, we will also sort firms each year by their probabilities from each model and find the number of defaults in several bins.
F. Implied Probabilities of Default
Besides examining the default prediction ability of the KMV-Merton model, we examine its ability to explain the variation in two market-based default probability variables. We regress both the implied probability of default from credit default swaps (CDS) and the yield spread on corporate bonds on π KMV and π Naive . While there is a large literature on explaining bond yield spreads, using CDS data to assess default probabilities is relatively new. Other recent papers that use CDS data include Longstaff, Mithay and Neis (2004) and Berndt, Douglas, Duffie, Ferguson and Schranz (2004) .
Credit default swaps are one example of credit derivatives, and credit derivative markets have 6 Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004) argue that hazard models are superior to other types of models. Popular credit derivatives such as the credit default swap allow market participants to trade credit risks with each other. We use the information in credit default swap premia to extract a direct measure of default probabilities and compare it with the estimates obtained from our methods.
In a credit default swap, the party buying credit protection pays the seller a fixed premium until either default occurs or the swap contract matures. In the event of a default, because these payments are made in arrears, a final accrual payment by the buyer is required. In return, if the underlying firm (the reference entity) defaults on its debt, the protection seller is obligated to buy back from the buyer the defaulted bond at its par value. The pay off from a credit default swap is simply one minus the recovery rate, which is the loss given default for every dollar of notional principal. Thus a CDS is similar to an insurance contract compensating the buyer for losses arising from a default.
Let s be the CDS spread, which is the amount paid per year as a percentage of the notional principal. Most CDS contracts have a maturity of five years. Let T determine the life of the CDS contract. Further assume that the probability of a reference entity defaulting during a year conditional on no earlier default is π CDS . For simplicity we assume that defaults always happen halfway through the year and the payments on the CDS are made once a year, at the end of each year. Thus the final accrual payment will be made halfway through the year and will be equal to 0.5 s. We also assume that the risk-free (LIBOR) rate is r with continuous compounding and the recovery is δ.
Thus the expected present value of the payments made on the CDS (assuming a notional principal of $1) is given by
The first term represents the discounted present value of the expected payments made at the end of each year provided the reference entity survives until period t and the second term represents the present value of the accrual payments made in the case of a default assuming default happens midway through the year.
Similarly the expected present value of the payoff is given by
We need an implied estimate of recovery rate δ in order to value the payoff. The same recovery rate is typically used to (a) estimate implied default probabilities and (b) value the CDS. The net result of this is that the value of a CDS (or the estimate of a CDS spread) is not very sensitive to the recovery rate. This is because implied probabilities of default are approximately proportional to 1/(1-δ) and the payoffs from a CDS are proportional to (1-δ), so that the expected payoff is almost independent of δ (Hull, Predescu and White (2004) ).
Setting the present value of the expected payments equal to the expected payoffs we can solve for π CDS from the resulting non linear equation. We know the CDS maturity T , the CDS spread s, the risk free rate r, and the recovery rate δ. As described above, we solve for π CDS for a sample of CDS spreads, and regress π CDS on π KMV , π Naive , and other variables. The results of our regressions are described in Section III E and Table 6 .
II. Data
We begin by examining all firms in the intersection of the Compustat Industrial file -Quarterly data and CRSP daily stock return for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks between 1980 and 2003.
We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6021, 6022, 6029, 6035, 6036 ) from the sample.
We obtain default data for the period 1980-2000 from the data base of firm defaults maintained by Edward Altman (The Altman default database). We supplement this information for 2001 through 2003 by using the list of defaults published by Moody's at their website www.moodys.com.
In all we obtain a total of 1,449 firm defaults covering the period 1980-2003.
The inputs to the KMV-Merton model include σ E the volatility of stock returns, F the face value of debt, r the risk free rate and T the time period. σ E is the annualized percent standard deviation of returns and is estimated from the prior year stock return data for each month. Vassalou and Xing (2003) . The correlation between the naive and Merton model expected default frequencies is very high at 86 percent, and it is significant at the 1% level. The similarity in distributions is also evident between the naive and Merton model estimates of asset volatility. The correlation between the 2 asset volatilities is 87 percent, and it is also significant at the 1% level.
Given that the naive counterparts (π Naive and Naive σ V ) of the output from the Merton model The next section addresses this question.
III. Results
We present a number of empirical results, including correlations of our probability estimates with those published by Moody's KMV, estimates of hazard models for time to default, out of sample forecast assessments, CDS implied default probability regressions and bond yield spread regressions.
We discuss each type of result in turn. Table   2 . Each default probability is computed as of August 2000.
A. Comparing Moody's KMV Probabilities to Ours
Among the 80 firms for which we have data, the rank correlation between our calculated π KMV and that calculated by Moody's KMV is 79 percent. The rank correlation between our naive probability and the Moody's KMV probability is also 79 percent. These high correlations indicate that both of our probability measures do a good job of capturing the information in the probability estimates published by Moody's KMV. Table 3 contains the results of estimating several Cox proportional hazard models. Models 1 through 3 are univariate hazard models, which explain time-to-default as a function of the KMV-Merton probability, the naive probability, and the log of market equity. While these are relatively simple univariate models, the fact that their explanatory variables vary with time means they are more complicated than they might at first appear. Models 1 through 3 confirm that the KMV-Merton probability, the naive probability and market equity are all extremely significant default predictors.
B. Hazard Model Results
Interestingly, the naive predictor and the KMV-Merton probability, which have similar magnitudes, also have similar coefficients and standard errors. The market value of equity is less significant than either the naive or the KMV-Merton probability. Unreported models that use the log of KMVMerton distance to default rather than the KMV-Merton probability perform uniformly worse than the results reported.
Model 4 in Table 3 combines the KMV-Merton and the naive probability in one hazard model.
Both covariates are very statistically significant, allowing us to conclude that the KMV-Merton is not a sufficient statistic for default probability, or allowing us to reject hypothesis one. Interestingly, both coefficients have similar magnitudes and similar statistical significance, but their significance and magnitude is much smaller in Model 4 than in Models 1 and 2. This reflects the fact that the KMV-Merton and naive probabilities are highly correlated. In fact, in our sample, their correlation coefficient is 0.86. Model 5 similarly combines the KMV-Merton probability and market equity, showing again that we can reject hypothesis one.
Models 6 and 7 include a number of other covariates: the firm's returns over the past year, the log of the firm's debt, the inverse of the firm's equity volatility, and the firm's ratio of net income to total assets. Each of these predictors is statistically significant, making our rejection of hypothesis one quite robust. Interestingly, with all of these predictors included in the hazard model, the KMV-Merton probability is no longer statistically significant, implying that we can reject hypothesis two. The magnitude of the KMV-Merton coefficient is much smaller in Model 6 than it is in Model 4, while its standard error is quite similar. The naive probability retains its statistical significance even though its coefficient drops by approximately one half. Panel A compares the predictions of the KMV-Merton model to the naive model, market equity, and past returns. While the KMV-Merton model probability is able to classify almost 65 percent of defaulting firms in the highest probability decile at the beginning of the quarter in which they default, the naive model is able to classify 65.8 percent of defaulting firms in the top decile. Fully 80.0 percent of defaults occur in the highest π KMV quintile, while 80.1 percent occur in the highest π Naive quintile. It is remarkable that the out of sample performance of π KMV is marginally worse than that of π Naive .
C. Out of Sample Results
The out of sample performance of both π KMV and π Naive is quite a bit better than simply sorting firms on their market equity. This is consistent with the results of Vassalou and Xing (2003) and indicates that the success of π KMV is not simply reflecting the predictive value of market equity. Apparently, it is quite useful to form a probability measure, by creating a zscore and using a cumulative distribution to calculate the corresponding probability. Given that π KMV does not perform better than π Naive in either hazard models or out of sample forecasts, the probability measure idea behind the KMV-Merton model may be a more valuable innovation than the simultaneous solution of equations (2) and (5).
Simply sorting firms on their excess equity return over the last year has surprisingly good forecasting power, as does sorting firms by their value of net income over total assets. This is consistent with the economic and statistical significance of both of these variables in the hazard model results reported in Table 3 . Since the KMV-Merton model has no simple way to capture 9 A rough calibration of probabilities associated with distance to default rankings can be inferred from the data in Table 4 . For example, the probability that firms in the top decile of πKMV will default in the next quarter is equal to the number of defaults occurring in the top decile (1449 * 0.649) divided by one tenth of the number of firm-quarter observations used to create the table (350,662 * 0.1), giving a probability of 2.7 percent. innovations in past returns or income, it is difficult to believe that π KMV can be a sufficient statistic for default. Any reasonable default prediction model probably needs to include some measure of past returns and net income.
Panel B reports similar forecasting assessments for a shorter time period, from 1991 to 2003.
Looking at defaults in this shorter period allows us to examine the out of sample performance of the hazard models reported in Table 3 . We estimate Models 6 and 7 from Table 3 The hazard models assessed in Panel B clearly outperform both π KMV and π Naive . This is not surprising, given that they employ more information in making their forecasts. This again implies that we can easily reject hypothesis one -π KMV is not a sufficient statistic to forecast default.
Interestingly, the hazard model that does not include π KMV as a covariate (Model 7) performs substantially better than π KMV , categorizing 76.8 percent of defaults in the highest hazard decile when they default versus 68.8 percent for π KMV . However, the hazard model that includes π KMV (Model 6) performs slightly better than Model 7, categorizing 77.1 percent of defaulting firms in the top hazard decile versus 76.8 percent. While π KMV appears to be making only a marginal contribution to a well-specified hazard model, it appears to be making a small positive contribution.
This makes it more difficult to unambiguously reject hypothesis two.
D. Alternative Predictors
In order to assess the importance of various calculations required to generate the KMV-Merton probabilities, we examine the forecasting performance of three alternative probabilities in Table   5 . The first of our three measures is a KMV-Merton probability that is calculated under the assumption that the expected return of each firm is the risk-free rate. We examine this predictor, which we denote π µ=r KMV , to determine how important the calculation of µ is for the distance to default in equation (6). Our second predictor, which we denote π simul KMV , is a KMV-Merton probability that is calculated by simultaneously solving equations (2) and (5) rather than following the more complicated iterative procedure described in the text. Our third alternative predictor is a KMVMerton probability that is calculated with option implied volatility rather than historical equity volatility. The implied volatility predictor, which we denote π impσ KMV , simultaneously solves equations (2) and (5) instead of using the iterative procedure. Each of our three alternative predictors can be thought of as KMV-Merton probabilities that are calculated with some strong simplifying assumptions. If these predictors perform as well as π KMV then we can conclude that the simplifying assumptions are valid.
It is important to point out that while our sample for π µ=r KMV and π simul KMV is the same as the samples described in the rest of the paper, our sample for π impσ KMV is much smaller, spanning 1996 through 2003 and containing 101,201 firm-months with complete data. We obtain the implied volatility of 30-day at-the-money call options from the IVY Database of Optionmetrics LLC. IVY is a comprehensive database of historical price, implied volatility and sensitivity information for the entire U.S. listed index and equity options market and contains historical data beginning in January 1996. The implied volatilities are calculated by Optionmetrics in accordance with the standard conventions used by participants in the equity option market, using a Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial tree model which is iterated until convergence of the model price to the market price of the option. Table 5 reports summary statistics for each variable, correlations between each of the variables and π KMV , and measures of out of sample prediction accuracy that correspond to those in Table 4 .
Looking at the correlations in Panel B, each of our alternative predictors is highly correlated with π KMV and with the other predictors in the table. Interestingly, the simultaneously solved π simul KMV is more correlated with π Naive than π KMV . The probability calculated with implied volatility is less correlated with π KMV than most of the other probabilities.
The out of sample forecast accuracy in Panel C allows us to gauge the relative importance of the iterative procedure, the estimation of µ, and the estimation of equity volatility. As in Table 4 Table  4 . To provide a performance benchmark for the π impσ KMV results, the fifth and sixth columns of Table  5 report on the success of π KMV and π Naive using the subset of firms for which implied volatility is available.
The estimation of µ for distance to default (equation 6) is apparently quite important. The probability that sets µ equal to the risk free rate performs substantially worse than π KMV out of sample, classifying only 60 percent of defaulting firms in the highest probability decile at the beginning of the quarter in which the firms default. π KMV is able to classify almost 65 percent of defaulting firms in the highest decile. Calculating KMV-Merton probabilities with the iterative procedure described in the text is apparently less important. The simultaneously solved π simul KMV actually has better out of sample predictive performance than the iteratively solved π KMV . This is consistent with the relative success of our naive probability in Tables 3 and 4 . Finally, using implied equity volatility rather than estimated equity volatility in our probability improves out of sample performance substantially. However, given that there are only 88 defaults to forecast in our sample of firms with corresponding options contracts, it is difficult to apply this finding to the broader sample of firms.
E. CDS Spread Regressions
Our previous results demonstrate that while π KMV appears to be a useful quantity for forecasting defaults, it is not a sufficient statistic for the purpose of forecasting. Our next two sets of results examine whether π KMV is an important explanatory variable for pricing credit-sensitive securities.
First we examine regressions of the implied probability of default from credit default swaps on π KMV and several alternatives. Bond yield spread regressions are our final set of results.
CDS default probability regressions are reported in Table 6 . We obtain the data on CDS spreads from www.credittrade.com for the period December 1998 to July 2003. From this source, we are able to collect 3833 firm-months of CDS spread observations. We calculate the probability that a firm defaults in the next year, π CDS , according to the algorithm described in section I.F. We then regress π CDS on π KMV , π Naive and all the other variables in the hazard models described in Table   3 . If π KMV is a well-calibrated and accurate probability of default, then the coefficient on π KMV in these regressions should be one.
Looking first at the correlations between π CDS and our probability measures, we see that π Naive is much more correlated with π CDS (at 51 percent) than π KMV (at 32 percent). Turning to the regressions, the coefficient on π KMV in the univariate regression of Model 1 is just 0.05, much lower than the predicted value of one. The same univariate regression with π Naive replacing π KMV yields a slightly more reasonable coefficient of 0.13. Combining π KMV and π Naive in one model (Model 3) results in π KMV losing all significance and the coefficient and significance of π Naive changing very little. Including all the other predictive variables makes π KMV statistically significant again, thought the coefficient on π KMV remains much smaller than either one or the coefficient on π Naive .
The CDS spread regression results in Table 6 show that, for the purpose of pricing credit-sensitive securities, the naive probability estimate performs at least as well as the KMV-Merton probability.
F. Bond Spread Results
Our final set of results are regressions of bond yields on our default probabililties. Before discussing our regression results, we describe the sample used to estimate the regressions. Summary statistics for the bond yield sample appear in Panel A of Table 7 .
Our bond data are extracted from the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database distributed by Warga (1998) . This database contains monthly price, accrued interest, and return data on all corporate and government bonds from 1971-1997. We use the data from the 1980-1997 period to be consistent with the default prediction sample. This is the same database used by Elton et al.(2001) to explain the rate spread on corporate bonds. In addition, the database contains descriptive data on bonds, including coupons, ratings, and callability. A subset of the data in the Warga database is used in this study. First, all bonds that were matrix priced rather than trader priced are eliminated from the sample 10 . Employing matrix prices might mean that all our analysis uncovers is the rule used to matrix-price bonds rather than the economic influences at work in the market. Eliminating matrix-priced bonds leaves us with a set of prices based on dealer quotes. This is the same type of data as that contained in the standard academic source of government bond data: the CRSP government bond file. Next, we eliminate all bonds with special features that would result in their being priced differently. This means we eliminate all bonds with options (e.g. callable bonds or bonds with a sinking fund), all corporate floating rate debt, bonds with an odd frequency of coupon payments, and inflation-indexed bonds. In addition, we eliminate all bonds not included in the Lehman Brothers bond indexes, because researchers in charge of the database at Lehman Brothers indicate that the care in preparing the data was much less for bonds not included in their indexes. This also results in eliminating data for all bonds with a maturity of less than one year. This exclusion is also consistent with our estimates of π KMV and π N aive , which are based on a one year forecasting horizon. Finally, we also remove AAA (Moody's rating Aaa) bonds because the data for these bonds appear problematic. Both Elton et al. (2001) and Campbell and Taksler (2003) exclude AAA bonds from their analysis for this reason. We are finally left with 62,584 bond-months with complete data in our sample.
There are a number of extreme values among the observations of each variable constructed from the Warga data. To ensure that statistical results are not heavily influenced by outliers, we set all observations higher than the 99th percentile of each variable to that value. All values lower than the first percentile of each variable are winsorized in the same manner. The minimum and maximum numbers reported in Panel A for the bond are calculated after winsorization. 11
We compute the spread on the corporate bond as the difference between the yield to maturity on a corporate bond in that particular month and the yield to maturity on a government bond of the closest maturity in the same month. For the benchmark treasuries, we use the CRSP fixed term indices, which provide monthly yield data on notes and bonds of 1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 20 and 30 target years to maturity. We assume that each quoted price in the Warga data is at the end of the month when the CRSP indices are published, but this should have little impact on the measured spreads. As can be seen from Panel A, the average spread is about 108 basis points over this sample period (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) , similar in magnitude to spreads reported in the other studies. We find that the magnitude of π KMV and π N aive are smaller than the values reported in Table 1 , suggesting that firms that have issuances in the bond market are better credit risks. The average maturity outstanding for the bonds in our sample is about 10 years and the Coupon rate is around 8.3%.
In Panel B of Table 7 we report the results of regressing bond yield spreads on a number of explanatory variables. Looking at the results, it appears that both π KMV and π Naive are significantly related to bond yield spreads. However, looking again at the results it quickly becomes clear that while spreads are correlated with both π KMV and π Naive , the coefficients on these default probabilities are too low. For example, given the coefficient of 0.5 for π Naive in Model 1, if π Naive increased from zero to five percent, the expected bond yield would increase by just 2.5 basis points.
The magnitude of the coefficients can be explained by the fact that bond rating dummies are included in these regressions, and bond ratings capture a large fraction of the variation in spreads.
The regression coefficients must be interpreted as capturing the explanatory power of our probability measures conditional on being in a particular ratings class.
In univariate regressions, the magnitude and statistical significance of π KMV is much smaller than that of π Naive . Combining both π KMV and π Naive in one spread regression makes the coefficient of π KMV become insignificant. When other explanatory variables are included in the regression, the coefficient on π Naive loses some of its significance but remains statistically distinguishable from zero. π KMV is less signficant, both statistically and economically.
Overall, the regressions indicate that π KMV is not strongly related to bond yield spreads after conditioning on bond ratings. This is consistent with the hazard model and out of sample results discussed previously.
IV. Conclusion
We examine the accuracy and the contribution of the KMV-Merton default forecasting model.
Looking at hazard models that forecast default, the KMV-Merton model does not appear to be a sufficient statistic for default. It appears to be possible to construct an accurate default forecasting model without considering the iterated KMV-Merton default probability. The naive probability that we propose, which captures both the functional form and the same basic inputs of the KMVMerton probability, performs surprisingly well. Looking at out of sample forecasting ability, it is fairly simple to construct a model that outperforms the KMV-Merton model without using the KMV-Merton default probability as an explanatory variable. However, hazard models that use the KMV-Merton probability with other covariates have slightly better out of sample performance than models which omit the KMV-Merton probability. Looking at CDS implied default probability regressions and bond yield spread regressions, the KMV-Merton probability does not appear to be a significant predictor of either quantity when our naive probability, agency ratings and other explanatory variables are accounted for. We conclude that the KMV-Merton probability is a marginally useful default forecaster, but it is not a sufficient statistic for default.
We acknowledge that our implementation of the KMV-Merton model is different from that of Moody's KMV, and therefore the forecasts of Moody's KMV might be better than those tested in this paper. Table 1 reports summary statistics for all the variables used in the KMV-Merton Model and the hazard models. E is the market value of equity in millions of dollars and is taken from CRSP as the product of share price at the end of the month and the number of shares outstanding. F is the face value of debt in millions of dollars (computed as Compustat item 45 + 0.5 * Compustat item 51). r is the risk-free rate measured as the 3 month Treasury-bill rate. The past returns variable, r it−1 − r mt−1 , is the difference between the prior year return of the firm and the return on the CRSP value weighted index during the same period, and N I/T A is the firm's ratio of net income to total assets. V is the market value of firm assets in millions of dollars, σ V is the asset volatility measured in percentage per annum, and µ is the expected return on the firm's assets. All three of these variables are generated as the result of solving the KMV-Merton model for each firm-month in the sample using the iterative procedure described in the text. π KMV is the expected default frequency in percent and is given by equation (7). Naive σ V is calculated by equation (10), and the firm's equity return from the previous year, r it−1 , is used as a proxy for the firm's expected asset return to calculate the naive probability of default, π Naive . Our naive probability, π Naive , is calculated according to equation (13) Table 3 reports the estimates of several Cox proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates. There are 15,018 firms and 1,449 defaults in the sample. π KMV is the KMV-Merton probability of default, π Naive is our naive alternative, ln(E) and ln(F ) are the natural logarithms of market equity and face value of debt respectively. 1/σ E is the inverse of equity volatility, measured with daily data over the previous year, r it−1 − r mt−1 is the stock's return over the previous year minus the market's return over the same period, and N I/T A is the firm's ratio of net income to total assets. A positive coefficient on a particular variable implies that the hazard rate is increasing in that variable, or that the expected time to default is decreasing in that variable. This table shows that the KMV-Merton default probability is not a sufficient statistic for forecasting default and that the naive default probability measure is at least as important as the KMVMerton measure. Standard errors are in parentheses (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent level). (2) and (5). This predictor avoids the iterative procedure in the text, estimating equity volatility with one year of historical returns data and using r as the expected return on assets. The third alternative predictor, π impσ KMV , uses the option-implied volatility of firm equity (implied σ E ) to simultaneously solve equations (2) and (5). Our sample for π µ=r KMV and π simul KMV is the same as the samples described in Table 1, Table 6 reports on a comparison of the probability of default implied by credit default swap (CDS) spreads with π KMV and π Naive . We obtain the data on CDS spreads from www.credittrade.com for the period December 1998 to July 2003. CDS spread is the credit default swap spread in basis points. π CDS is is the probability of default backed out from the CDS spread. All other measures are described in table 1 of the paper. The total number of firm-month observations is 3,833. Panel A reports summary statistics, Panel B reports correlations, and Panel C reports the results of regressing the default probability implied by the CDS spread on π KMV , π Naive and several other predictive variables. In Panel C, standard errors are shown in parentheses (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent level). Table 7 reports the results of bond yield spread regressions. Spread is the difference between the yield to maturity on the bond and the yield of the closest maturity treasury in basis points. σ E is the standard deviation of equity returns. Maturity is the remaining time to maturity in years of the bonds. Coupon is the coupon rate on the bond issue. r is the risk free rate measured as the 3 month t-bill rate. Amount is the dollar amount of the bond issue. π KMV is the expected default frequency in percent, given by equation (7), and π Naive is the corresponding naive default probability measure given by equation (13). All observations except the default frequency measures are winsorized at the first and ninety-nineth percentiles. The data span 1980 through 1997 and there are 61,776 bond-months with complete data in our sample. Panel A reports summary statistics for the sample used in the regressions and Panel B reports the regression results. In addition to the variables described in Panel A, all regressions have year, rating and 1 digit sic code dummies. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent level). This table shows that the naive default probability can replace the KMV-Merton probability in explaining bond yields. 
